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Advances in the capacity to manage overseas operations have been linked to foreign- 
owned subsidiaries of multinational enterprises performing more varied roles for their 
parent organisations than they did in the past. Drawing on evidence from an original large- 
scale survey, this study explores the international roles performed by 429 foreign-owned 
subsidiaries in New Zealand. Traditionally, subsidiaries in New Zealand have predomi- 
nantly been established to service the local market which although comparatively small is 
remote from major sources of foreign investment. The study ﬁnds that many subsidiaries 
have some form of international role and that subsidiaries frequently perform a variety of 
roles for their organisations. Investigation of subsidiary characteristics associated with an 
international role ﬁnds that those managed independently, and those managed by a net- 
work of reporting channels have most propensity and potential to engage in international 
roles. This evidence justiﬁes greater recognition that subsidiary operations may make 
multiple contributions to their organisation rather than have a single  purpose. 
Keywords: Subsidiary international roles; subsidiary global initiative; exports; MNE 
management structures. 
 
 
Introduction 
It is now frequently claimed that the overseas subsidiaries of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) are best understood as operating within networks of control 
and inﬂuence rather than being contained within a tightly speciﬁed managerial 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
hierarchy (Andersson and Forsgren, 1996; Andersson et al., 2007). The conse- 
quence of this evolution in subsidiary management remains an area of debate. 
One proposition is that the growing scale of MNEs combined with an increased 
capacity to coordinate subsidiary operations is seeing the emergence of “perfor- 
mance plants” that are allocated regional or even world product mandates by their 
parent company (Pike, 1998; Pike et al., 2007). Such a claim implies that sub- 
sidiary operations remain potentially important units of analysis according to the 
roles that they are allocated. In contrast, an alternative proposition argues that 
subsidiaries are ceasing to be signiﬁcant entities in their own right and in this sense 
they have become something of an “endangered species” — according to this 
view, subsidiary operations have been dissected into individual value-adding 
functions (such as logistics, sales, manufacturing, research and development) each 
of which has its own reporting lines and operational ties (Birkinshaw and Ped- 
ersen, 2010). With the dilution of responsibility held by national country managers 
in favour of managing international operations through global business units, the 
operational coherence of subsidiaries has diminished. Rather than individual sites 
gaining broad responsibilities, the organisational capacity of MNEs is encouraging 
them to pursue corporate strategies by combining the resources of multiple locations. 
Against these expectations of signiﬁcant change in the management of sub- 
sidiary operations, this paper investigates the international roles performed by a 
large sample of (429) foreign-owned subsidiaries located in New Zealand and 
whether these roles can be related to subsidiary characteristics. The subsidiaries of 
foreign-owned companies in New Zealand have typically been thought to act 
mainly as marketing outposts to distribute goods and services developed elsewhere 
(KPMG, 1995; Scott-Kennel, 2001). This limited mandate may have contributed 
to a view that New Zealand’s subsidiaries are comparatively simple operations 
existing with truncated responsibilities. For example, with the possible addition of 
some ﬁnal processing and market customisation New Zealand based subsidiaries 
operate typically with few ties other than those to their parent company (Scott- 
Kennel, 2007). The main purpose of the present investigation is to determine 
whether this assessment has been superseded with subsidiaries now performing 
more diverse roles for their parent organisation. Evidence of this occurring would 
be signiﬁcant for two reasons. 
First, it would be signiﬁcant conﬁrmation of the evolution in subsidiary control 
where this can be shown to have affected subsidiaries that have previously been 
comparatively unconnected from a larger corporate endeavour. Second, where 
overseas ownership is associated with increasing operational freedom and devel- 
opment opportunity beyond a narrow responsibility for servicing the local market, 
there is a stronger case for supporting foreign investment than where foreign- 
owned subsidiaries mainly service the local market. The OECD has claimed  that 
 
  
 
 
 
 
administrative controls on foreign investment have tightened over the last decade 
(OECD, 2009, 2011). This change affects the potential grounds on which foreign 
investment might be challenged by the government’s Overseas Investment Ofﬁce 
(which reviews and decides on inward FDI applications for New Zealand). The 
practical extent of the change is minor but it does reﬂect longstanding anxiety that 
foreign owners are focused on transferring proﬁts overseas rather than facilitating 
subsidiary development for the wider beneﬁt of the local economy (Raziq and 
Perry, 2012a; Rosenberg, 1998). As well as the ability to comment on these issues 
the study explores whether the forms of subsidiary control and behaviour observed 
in New Zealand are more consistent with the possibility of selective upgrading to 
the status of a performance plant or the fragmentation of subsidiary power across 
inter connected locations. 
The paper explores the development and evolution of foreign-owned subsidiaries 
in New Zealand by taking their international roles as determinants of their devel- 
opment. The internationalisation-developmental perspective taken here builds on the 
argument that the internationalisation process of the ﬁrms is followed by the de- 
velopmental process of the ﬁrms as ﬁrms increasingly involve and commit resources 
to subsidiaries in overseas markets (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1997; Johanson and 
Vahlne, 1977). This perspective identiﬁes three actors as having inﬂuence over the 
development of overseas subsidiaries: subsidiary itself, the parent MNE, and the 
subsidiary local environment, (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1997). In this view of sub- 
sidiary development, entrepreneurial initiatives taken by the overseas subsidiaries 
are seen to be the primary drivers of subsidiary development (Birkinshaw, 1997). 
The paper proceeds by ﬁrst providing a brief summary of literature about sub- 
sidiary roles, with a special emphasis on international roles and global initiatives of 
subsidiaries. This is followed by a brief literature on subsidiaries in New Zealand. 
The design of the survey that provides the original data analysed in the paper is then 
discussed followed by an outline of the principal ﬁndings and their implications. 
 
Subsidiary Roles 
Generally a subsidiary may be allocated one of the three primary roles: local 
implementer, specialized contributor, and world mandate (Table 1). Local 
implementers largely focus on the local market and have high operational au- 
tonomy to implement strategy in the host market; specialised contributors are 
largely interdependent business units within the MNE, having less autonomy; 
world mandate subsidiaries are both locally responsive and globally integrated, 
having both operational and strategic autonomy (Birkinshaw and Morrison, 1995; 
Jarillo and Martínez, 1990). Subsidiaries that take on global strategies serve a 
number of markets and have high potential to offer country speciﬁc advantages to 
 
  
Table 1.  Subsidiary role typology. 
 
 
Key authors 
 
Local 
implementer Specialised contributor World mandate 
White and Poynter (1984)   Miniature replica Rationalised manufacturer 
Product specialist 
Global mandate 
D’Cruz (1986) Branch plant Globally rationalized World product 
mandate 
Bartlett and Ghoshal 
(1986) 
Jarillo and Martínez 
(1990) 
Implementer Contributor Strategic leader 
 
Autonomous Receptive Active 
Gupta and Govindarajan 
(1991) 
Local innovator 
Implementer 
Global innovator Integrated player 
  
Roth and Morrison (1992) Integrated Global subsidiary 
mandate 
(Source: Birkinshaw and Morrison (1995, Table 1).) 
 
the MNE (Rugman and Verbeke, 1992). Subsidiaries following a global strategy 
possess considerable resources, capabilities and expertise (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 
1986) and are largely unconstrained by parent company controls on the scope of 
their activity (Birkinshaw and Morrison, 1995; White and Poynter,  1984). 
The links between international activity (e.g. exports), local economy devel- 
opment and the host industry productivity are well established (Kneller and Pisu, 
2007). Research evidence suggests that foreign-owned MNE subsidiaries fre- 
quently engage in international activities and may promote the international ac- 
tivity of the domestic ﬁrms (Blake and Pain, 2002; Wang et al., 2007). 
Subsidiaries reduce their production costs through utilisation of host country factor 
endowments (Njong, 2008). Foreign subsidiary international activities increase 
international market competitiveness in the host market which is responded by the 
domestic ﬁrms in the form of raising their international activity to protect their 
market share and earnings (Kneller and Pisu, 2007; Njong,  2008). 
It is generally expected that subsidiaries are restricted to the roles assigned to 
them by the parent MNEs but there are two processes that generate some inde- 
pendence in subsidiary activity. First, greenﬁeld subsidiaries are more likely to be 
constrained to the roles established by their parent than those that have previously 
operated independently or as part of differently owned group (Estrin et al., 2008). 
At the least, a period of time may lapse where an acquired subsidiary is integrated 
into the new owner’s operations (Andersson and Forsgren, 1996; Harzing, 1999). 
Second, subsidiaries can take on strategies (initiatives) that reﬂect their own in- 
dependent decision making (Birkinshaw and Pedersen, 2010; White and 
Poynter,1984). Initiatives can focus on either external (local or global) or the 
MNE’s internal market or some combination of both (Birkinshaw, 1997). 
Initiative taking can be viewed as a dispersed form of corporate 
entrepreneurship that has the possibility of augmenting distinctive subsidiary 
capabilities, encouraging head ofﬁce openness toward future subsidiary 
initiatives and of strengthening the subsidiary’s credibility vis-à-vis the parent 
organisation (Birkinshaw, 1997, 1999). Global initiatives are most likely to be 
taken by subsidiaries with world mandates and those with distinctive resources 
and capabilities — as well, it has been observed that resources and capabilities 
developed in the local markets can be applied to meet the opportunities identiﬁed 
in the global markets (Birkinshaw, 1997). 
Subsidiary decision making ability is inﬂuenced by the subsidiary 
management structures which may be hierarchical (centralised management) or 
heterarchical (decentralised management) (Dicken, 2007; Raziq and Perry, 
2013). This suggests that roles and the management structures through which 
subsidiaries are controlled are linked in that a single reporting line gives more 
scope to tightly maintaining the activity of a subsidiary than does a heterarchical 
control structure. Management structures include direct management by the 
parent headquarters, management by regional headquarters/ofﬁces, 
networks/divisional headquarters, mandated ofﬁces, and also independent 
management by the subsidiary itself (Raziq and Perry, 2013). Subsidiaries under 
these structures operate under varying control levels, e.g. subsidiaries managed 
  
under regional headquarters are largely inﬂuenced (by their regional 
headquarters) in terms of developing their product, marketing and competitive 
strategies (Yeung et al., 2001), as opposed to other subsidiaries (e.g. managed 
independently) which generally do not require approvals for their operational and 
strategic decisions from headquarters. 
Subsidiaries that are managed independently are able to pursue their own 
strategies, enhance their roles and have more chances to further develop than less 
autonomous subsidiaries (Venaik et al., 2005). Subsidiaries that are managed by 
networks of reporting channels are generally managed under divisional head- 
quarters. Subsidiaries generally perform a range of activities i.e. discreet value- 
added activities (e.g. development, training, manufacturing, and marketing facil- 
ities) for the MNE, and each of the subsidiary function generally reports to a 
separate division/unit (Forsgren et al., 1995). Under such structures where there 
are multiple units supervising activities of a single subsidiary, the decision 
making capacity within a subsidiary (among functions) is likely to differ. 
 
Subsidiary activity in New Zealand 
 
Foreign subsidiaries in New Zealand have depended much more upon 
offshore and particularly parent company resources than upon linkages with local 
ﬁrms (Scott-Kennel, 2001). This arises from the primary motive for foreign 
investment in New Zealand having been to access the local market (KPMG, 
1995; Scott- Kennel, 2001). A secondary motive was to use New Zealand as an 
export base to access Australasian and Asian markets and as a manufacturing 
base to produce and sell products within and outside New Zealand but this was 
thought to be some- thing few subsidiaries did other than those engaged in the 
primary sector and involved in the export of mineral and agricultural 
commodities (Enderwick, 1995; KPMG, 1995; Scott-Kennel, 2001). 
Regarding the overseas activity of subsidiaries a government survey of 
business operations in New Zealand estimates that more than half of all 
subsidiaries engage in imports, more than one-third but less than half of the 
subsidiaries engage in exports, less than a quarter engage in overseas production, 
and around one-third engage in collaboration with overseas organisations 
(Statistics-NZ, 2005–2011). The same survey shows few constraints on overseas 
activity, with exchange rate levels being the most likely (21% of the subsidiaries) 
constraint on subsidiary international activity to be cited. Against some 
expectations (see Harzing and Noorderhaven, 2006; Mauro, 2000), potential 
constraints due to New Zealand’s isolation and geographical remoteness (e.g. 
transportation costs) are not seen as major constraints by the majority of 
subsidiaries. 
As for the global entrepreneurial activities of subsidiaries in New Zealand 
rather less empirical evidence exists, but some guidelines exist (from Statistics 
New Zealand data sources) on subsidiary activities including research and de- 
velopment and innovation. It is believed that engagement in research and devel- 
opment and innovation activity result in enhancement of subsidiary potential to 
take entrepreneurial initiatives (Birkinshaw, 1997). Statistics New Zealand data 
reveal that while overall a good percentage of foreign subsidiaries in New 
Zealand are involved in innovation (on average around 62% of subsidiaries), it is 
  
seen at low levels when individual innovation activity is analysed (see Appendix 
B). As for R&D activity rather no data exists on the extent and nature of activity, 
but as a whole it is found that on average 15% of subsidiaries undertake R&D   
activity. 
 
 
Conceptual  Framework 
The major research question guiding this study is: “What if any, is the international 
role of foreign-owned subsidiaries in New Zealand?” To answer this question the 
study includes a number of secondary questions: 
1. Based upon their international roles, what types of subsidiaries exist in New 
Zealand? 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
2. What is the potential of foreign subsidiaries in New Zealand to take on in- 
ternational roles? 
(a) What is the extent of autonomy exercised by subsidiaries, and what is the 
extent of parent resource support received by subsidiaries? 
(b) To what extent are opportunities to use New Zealand as an export base 
recognized by the parent MNEs? 
3. To what extent do subsidiaries have international roles? 
(a) How important are local vs. international markets for subsidiaries? 
(b) To what extent do subsidiaries take on global entrepreneurial  initiatives? 
4. How do subsidiary parent country of origin, types of investments, types of 
industry, and management structures affect subsidiary investment in interna- 
tional roles? 
The study distinguishes two main types of international roles: exporting and 
entrepreneurial initiative. Exporting is conceived as simply selling the products/ 
services outside the host country (i.e. New Zealand) for example to regional/global 
markets. Entrepreneurial initiative taking is less easily deﬁned than exporting. It 
can be seen as an (opportunistic) activity taken in response to a threat/opportunity 
seen in the focal (local, internal, global) market; an assigned activity by head- 
quarters; or a planned activity by subsidiary — the purpose and expected outcome 
of all may be more than simply selling products/services. The study looks at only 
one type of initiative i.e. “global initiative”, which is generally viewed as an 
entrepreneurial activity taken outside the host country. 
The study includes a number of other factors that potentially inﬂuence the 
international roles e.g. subsidiary autonomy, parent resource support, parent MNE 
perceptions about New Zealand to be used for international activity, subsidiary 
home country, and subsidiary investment origins. The study also includes some 
key background concepts (e.g. motives of investment, industry type, and the 
management structure under which the subsidiary operates) all of which have 
relevance to the subsidiary international roles. 
The study measures the extent of global market initiatives currently taken and/ 
or taken in the past. It is assumed that to take global initiative, subsidiaries require 
high levels of autonomy and parent resource support. Autonomy can be of two 
types operational and strategic,  with  strategic  identiﬁed  as  policy  decisions  
on “R&D, product developments, and marketing” and operational to processes 
including production, sales, distribution and human resource management 
(McDonald et al., 2008). Autonomy is also needed for subsidiaries to take on 
export  roles,  and  it  has  been  found  that  autonomous  subsidiaries  have high 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
propensity to export (McDonald et al., 2008). As for any initiative, subsidiaries 
require resource support and are largely dependent on parent ﬁrm resources — 
literature suggests that subsidiaries in New Zealand largely draw on parent ﬁrm 
resources (Scott-Kennel, 2001), and though subsidiaries could get funding from 
external and domestic sources as well, majority get resources from parent ﬁrms 
(Dutton et al., 1999; Williams et al.,  2008). 
As for exports, the study focuses on the extent to which the subsidiaries cur- 
rently serve non-New Zealand markets and the parent MNE perceptions about 
New Zealand as an export base. Inﬂuencing factors for driving exports include 
autonomy as it has been found that subsidiaries possessing high levels of auton- 
omy actively engage in exporting of products/services (McDonald et al., 2011). 
Another inﬂuencing factor is subsidiary country of origin although a number of 
studies make contrasting claims as to whether country of origin affects the pro- 
pensity to export (Fontagne and Pajot, 1997; Lipsey, 1991; O’Sullivan, 1993; 
Yamawaki, 2007). Other factors include the types of investment as it has been 
argued that acquired ﬁrms are more likely to be exporting than other ﬁrms (Estrin 
et al., 2008). 
 
 
Survey Design 
This study makes use of data from a survey of foreign-owned subsidiaries in New 
Zealand that was conducted from November 2011 to April 2012. The focus is on 
the survey data measuring subsidiary international activity and subsidiary char- 
acteristics that might be associated with differences in the activity undertaken. A 
summary of the questionnaire components drawn upon is provided  in  Appendix 
D. 
The survey covered a sample of 952 wholly foreign-owned subsidiaries oper- 
ating in New Zealand. The sample was obtained from Kompass New Zealand. 
Company Ofﬁce New Zealand also maintains an ofﬁcial list of foreign-owned 
companies registered with them, but does not disclose postal addresses to public. 
The sampling frame therefore was mainly derived from the list provided by 
Kompass New Zealand supplemented by those from the Company Ofﬁce list for 
which an internet address could be located. 
The survey requested completion by the person who leads the subsidiary’s 
foreign operations in New Zealand. In practice this included respondents with 
various designations including CEO, Country Manager, Managing Director, 
General Manager, COO, and the CFO. The survey was distributed by email and 
postal distribution depending on whether the Kompass database included an email 
address and whether the email request was responded to: respondents who did not 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
respond to the email were sent postal surveys. The total responses received were 
435 — six of the responses were partial therefore were deleted, leaving the total 
responses to 429; the ﬁnal response rate is 45.06%, which as identiﬁed by the 
comparable studies of multinational subsidiaries is well above the general response 
rate (see Harzing, 1997). 
A number of tests are performed to check if the data is biased in terms of 
responses received, and the common method. Data is also checked for linearity/ 
normal distribution. As the data was obtained in more than one stage i.e. reminders 
had to be sent, a possibility of response bias may emerge, as the data may be 
dominated by responses, from respondents who were eager to respond, than those 
who were busy or reluctant. Extrapolation method is used to check for response 
bias (Armstrong and Overton, 1977; Pace, 1939) — mean scores of all the items 
(early responses vs. late responses) are compared to check for signiﬁcant differ- 
ences. No signiﬁcant difference was found on any item, hence the data was 
deemed to be clear of any response  bias. 
As all the responses were received from a single respondent, a risk of common 
method bias exists. Harman single factor test is used to see if such a tendency 
occurs in the data exists — as per the method all the variables are loaded on to a 
single factor (under exploratory factor analysis) and checked that the total variance 
does not exceed 50% (Harman, 1967). Results show a total variance of 14% hence 
clearing the data of any common method  bias. 
To test whether the data are normally distributed, Kolmogorov–Smirnov and 
Shapiro–Wilk tests are employed (Justel et al., 1997; Shapiro and Wilk, 1965) — 
the tests showed that data is not normally distributed. Despite the growing argu- 
ment that (under central limit theorem) large samples do not necessarily have to be 
checked for data normality (Lumley et al., 2002), in order to avoid any false 
positives, non-parametric equivalents e.g. Kruskal–Wallis analysis of variance 
(that do not assume data is normally distributed) test (instead of the traditional 
ANOVA) are employed (Kruskal and Wallis, 1952). 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
The results and discussion section is divided into four parts. The ﬁrst part looks at 
the proﬁle of subsidiaries in New Zealand and includes analysis on the key 
background concepts i.e. the subsidiary country of origin, entry mode and motives 
of investment. Part two presents the subsidiary potential for international roles and 
includes data analysis of a number of concepts that can be considered as precursors 
of international roles; they include subsidiary autonomy, parent resource support 
for subsidiaries, and perceptions to use New Zealand as an export base. Part three 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
looks at the subsidiary actual participation in international roles and includes 
analysis on subsidiary roles and subsidiary entrepreneurial initiatives. Part four 
looks at how based on characteristics some groups of subsidiaries may emerge. 
 
 
Proﬁle of subsidiaries in New Zealand 
Slightly over half the 429 responses are from subsidiaries with headquarters 
domiciled in Australia (112) and the United States (111). Subsidiaries from Japan 
(38), United Kingdom (37) and, Germany (31) are the next most important con- 
centrations. By region, the largest share are European (130) followed by Oceania 
(117), North America (115), and Asia (67). Overall it is seen that subsidiaries 
involve investment from all parts of the world. Acquisitions (48%) and greenﬁeld 
operations (42%) account for the majority of responses. Access to the local 
markets is the major (current) motive for multinationals to operate in New Zealand 
(Table 2). 
 
 
Subsidiary potential for international roles 
This section includes results summary of the inﬂuencing factors (including au- 
tonomy, parent resource support, and parent MNE perceptions about New Zealand 
as an export base) that drive subsidiary international roles. 
 
 
Subsidiary autonomy 
Subsidiaries have reasonable levels of autonomy for strategic and operational 
decisions (for distinctive measures see Appendix A) but tend to have more au- 
tonomy for decisions that are of operational nature than those that are of strategic 
nature (Table 3). Results indicate that on average, foreign subsidiaries in New 
Zealand possess operational autonomy to a major extent, and strategic autonomy at 
moderate extent. Autonomy may be high in some areas and low on others, and 
may vary from subsidiary to subsidiary based upon their roles and mandates e.g. 
subsidiaries that are chartered to serve a local market only may be highly locally 
autonomous and may have high levels of operational autonomy (but low levels of 
strategic autonomy Jarillo and Martínez, 1990), and subsidiaries that serve both 
global and local markets tend to have high levels of both operational and strategic 
autonomy (Birkinshaw and Morrison, 1995). New Zealand where subsidiaries are 
primarily built (more than two-third) to seek local markets only, and are heavily 
inﬂuenced (93% of subsidiaries) by headquarters on long-term decisions (Scott- 
Kennel, 2001), are  likely to  be highly controlled by headquarters  in  terms     of 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Current motives to operate in New Zealand (frequency and percentage)  . 
 
  Degree of inﬂuence 
 None (1)  Minor extent (2)  Moderate extent (3)  Major extent (4)  Sole (5) 
Motives in New Zealand (429) f %  f %  f %  f %  f % 
Access to resources 248 57.8  73 17  50 11.7  52 12.1  6 1.4 
Access to the local market 37 8.6  24 5.6  37 8.6  196 45.7  135 31.5 
Access to technology, or R&D activity 269 62.7  98 22.8  37 8.6  22 5.1  3 0.7 
Important customers are located in New Zealand 103 24  57 13.3  74 17.2  152 35.4  43 10 
Other 406 94.6  0 0  0 0  17 4.0  6 1.4 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.  Subsidiary autonomy (frequency, percentage, mean and SD). 
Degree of inﬂuence 
 
Not at all (1) Minor extent (2) Moderate extent (3) Major extent (4) Complete (5) 
 
Subsidiary autonomy (n = 429) f %  f %  f %  f %  f % µ SD 
Strategic autonomy 3 0.7  48 11.2  161 37.5  180 42  37 8.6 3.47 0.83 
Operational autonomy 4 0.9  25 5.8  127 29.6  192 44.8  81 18.9 3.75 0.86 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
activity, and so subsidiaries may possess high levels of operational autonomy 
while their strategic autonomy is low (Raziq et al., 2012,  2013). 
 
Parent resource support 
In the ﬁve years prior to the survey, 19.8% (85) of subsidiaries sought parent 
resource support for global market initiatives of which 0.9% (4) were refused 
resource support, 10.3% (44) received partial resource support and only 8.4% (36) 
received full resource support. This indicates that while resource seeking from 
parents is low when requested some support is usually  forthcoming. 
 
New Zealand as an export  base 
Opportunities to use New Zealand as an export base are recognized to a “minor” 
or  “moderate”  by  almost  half  the  respondents  (47.1%).  Analysis  by   industry 
(Primary Industries (N ¼ 5; µ ¼ 2:8); Manufacturing (N ¼ 187; µ ¼ 2:84); Services 
(N ¼ 237; µ ¼ 2:43)) show that while opportunities to use New Zealand as an export 
base are recognized at almost  the same extent  (i.e. minor  to     moderate)  among 
subsidiaries, signiﬁcant differences (using Kruskal–Wallis test) are seen only between 
manufacturing sector and services sector industries (H ¼ 5:492; df ¼ 1; p ¼ 0:019). 
This shows that manufacturing sector industries are more likely to be exporting than 
service sector industries — this ﬁnding seems consistent with the general tendency for 
services sector subsidiaries to be less likely to export. 
Examining the link between subsidiaries potential to take on export activity and 
their management hierarchies/heterarchies e.g. (parent control (N ¼ 44; µ ¼ 2:41); 
RHQ/ofﬁces (N ¼ 226; µ ¼ 2:48); mandated ofﬁces (N ¼ 18; µ ¼ 2:22); net- 
work/DHQ control (N ¼ 15; µ ¼ 2:93); independent control (N ¼ 126; µ ¼ 
2:94)) reveal the same extent (i.e. minor to moderate) of export opportunity. 
Signiﬁcant   differences   however   have   been   found   among   subsidiaries  — 
subsidiaries managed independently are more likely to use New Zealand as an 
export base than subsidiaries managed by parent headquarters (H ¼ 4:167; df  ¼ 
1; p ¼ 0:041),  and  subsidiaries  managed  by  RHQs/ofﬁces  (H ¼ 7:488; df ¼ 
1; p ¼ 0:006). A logical explanation of this can be that subsidiaries that are 
managed independently are more open in pursuing their perceived  opportunities, 
and are less constrained than subsidiaries that are put under different  hierarchies. 
 
Subsidiary participation in international  roles 
Markets served 
A third (32.6%) of subsidiaries are engaged solely in serving the local market and 
over half (54.5%) are predominantly engaged in serving the local market while  a 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
small number (3%) have no involvement with the local market. The proﬁle is 
almost revered with respect to serving international markets: close to a third 
(30.5%) do not serve international markets at all — approximately 20% of the 
subsidiaries actively serve non-New Zealand markets while 18% take the inter- 
national activity at moderate extents. Among the 20% that actively serve the 
international markets (slightly more than two thirds) also actively serve the local 
New Zealand markets. This suggests that slightly less than 15% of subsidiaries 
have broader roles in New Zealand, and may be considered as “active” subsidiaries 
(Birkinshaw and Morrison, 1995; Jarillo and Martínez, 1990). 
An analysis of whether there are subsidiaries that serve local markets only or 
serve international markets only, indicates that there are eighty subsidiaries 
(18.6%) that primarily serve the local market and do not serve any other markets, 
where as there are only seven subsidiaries (1.6%) that primarily serve international 
markets and do not serve New Zealand local market (1.6%). This shows that 80% 
of subsidiaries in New Zealand undertake more than one role — this indicates that 
roles of majority of subsidiaries in New Zealand are difﬁcult to identify, if the 
expected/resultant role is only one role. These ﬁndings support the argument that 
subsidiary role is a complex phenomenon and subsidiaries do not necessarily have 
to have one role at a time, but can take multiple roles at any one time (Cavanagh 
and Freeman, 2012; Enright and Subramanian, 2007; Rugman et al.,  2011). 
The characteristics of subsidiaries that primarily serve the local market, pri- 
marily serve the international markets only, and predominantly serve the inter- 
national markets are further explored (Table 4). Results show that more than half 
of subsidiaries that serve the local markets only are acquisitions and have fewer 
than 50 employees, majority owned by Australian based MNEs, managed by 
regional headquarters (with 26 based in Australia), and majority are services sector 
subsidiaries. Characteristics of subsidiaries that serve the international markets 
only show that majority of subsidiaries belong to manufacturing sector, are 
acquisitions and are managed independently. Characteristics of subsidiaries that 
predominantly serve the international markets show that majority of subsidiaries 
are manufacturing sector subsidiaries and have more than 50  employees. 
Analysis by industry shows that subsidiaries belonging to the primary industry 
serve  international  markets  at  major  extent  (µ ¼ 3:8),  and      manufacturing 
(µ ¼ 2:43) and services (µ ¼ 2:11), at minor to moderate extents. Signiﬁcant 
differences (using Kruskal–Wallis test) are seen among the subsidiaries — pri- 
mary industry subsidiaries serve international markets more than both the 
manufacturing industry subsidiaries (H ¼ 5:640; df ¼ 1; p ¼ 0:018), and services 
industry  subsidiaries  (H ¼ 8:009; df ¼ 1; p ¼ 0:005).  Manufacturing industry 
subsidiaries   serve   international   markets   more   than   the   services   industry 
subsidiaries (H ¼ 6:665; df ¼ 1; p ¼ 0:01). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.  Subsidiary characteristics (local only, international only, predominantly international). 
 
Subsidiary focus Age Industry Size (employees) Entry mode Country of origin Management structures 
Local market only (80) <5 years: 8 Manufacturing: 31 <50:46 Greenﬁeld: 27 USA: 19 Parent: 10 
 5–10 years: 9 Services: 49 50–200:20 Acquisition: 45 Australia: 26 RHQ/ofﬁces: 45 
 11–20 years: 15  201–500:8 Merger: 2 Japan: 11 Branch: 4 
 >20 years: 48  501–1000:2 Joint Venture: 4 European: 19 Independent: 21 
 
Exports only (7) 
 
5–10 years: 1 
 
Primary Industry: 1 
>1000:4 
<50:3 
Other: 2 
Greenﬁeld: 1 
Asian: 5 
USA: 1 
 
Parent: 1 
 11–20 years: 2 Manufacturing: 5 50–200:1 Acquisition: 6 Australia: 1 RHQ/ofﬁres: 2 
 >20 years: 4 Services: 1 201–500:3  European: 3 Independent: 4 
     Asian: 2  
Predominant exports - 20% (84) <5 years: 4 Primary Industry: 4 <50:41 Greenﬁeld: 35 USA: 16 Parent: 7 
 5–10 years: 11 Manufacturing: 46 50–200: 24 Acquisition: 38 Australia: 13 RHQ/ofﬁces: 34 
 11–20 years: 19 Services: 34 201–500: 13 Merger: 6 Canada: 3 Network: 5 
 >20 years: 50  501–1000:4 Joint Venture: 5 European: 28 Independent: 38 
   >1000:2 Franchise: 1 Asian: 21  
    Other: 4 Oceania: 3   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis by management structures (parent control (µ ¼ 2:23); RHQ/ofﬁces 
(µ ¼ 2:2); mandated ofﬁces (µ ¼ 1:72); network/DHQ control (µ ¼ 2:47); inde- 
pendent control (µ ¼ 2:52)) show that subsidiaries managed independently  
serve  international  markets  more  than  subsidiaries  managed  by RHQs/ofﬁces 
(H ¼ 4:643; df ¼ 1; p ¼ 0:031) and subsidiaries managed by mandated ofﬁces 
(H ¼ 6:155; df ¼ 1; p ¼ 0:013). 
Subsidiary initiative 
Almost half (47.8%) of the subsidiaries have been involved in some form of global 
initiative in the ﬁve years prior to the survey — thought only 11% are actively 
involved in such initiatives. A major requirement for global market initiatives is 
high level of subsidiary strategic autonomy (Birkinshaw, 1997). While results (see 
Table 4) have shown that a good number of subsidiaries possess some form of 
strategic autonomy, the low number of subsidiaries that are actively involved in 
global initiatives indicate that subsidiaries may not have adequate strategic au- 
tonomy to undertake a global strategy. As serving the local New Zealand market is 
seen as the primary focus among subsidiaries, subsidiaries are likely to take a 
locally responsive strategy than a globally integrated strategy. The moderate to 
major levels of strategic autonomy (as indicted in this study, and as a characteristic 
of subsidiaries taking locally responsive strategy) is likely to be for serving the 
local markets only than for the global  markets. 
 
Subsidiary international role by country of origin and entry  mode 
There are six countries represented in the sample with 15 or more subsidiaries: 
Australia, United States, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, and Switzerland. 
Using  the  Kruskal–Wallis  analysis  of  variance  test  among  the  six countries: 
Australia (N ¼ 112; µ ¼ 2:07), United States  (N ¼ 111; µ ¼ 2:22), Germany 
(N ¼ 31; µ ¼ 2:16), Japan (N ¼ 38; µ ¼ 2:29), United Kingdom (N ¼ 37; µ ¼ 
2:54), Switzerland (N ¼ 15; µ ¼ 2:07) a signiﬁcant difference is found between 
two subsidiary groups. Subsidiaries belonging to UK have a higher  international 
role (H ¼ 4:058; df ¼ 1; p ¼ 0:044) than subsidiaries belonging to Australia. 
Findings support the (one of the two opposing) claims about the subsidiary home 
country as factors inﬂuencing export capacities of subsidiaries — results ﬁnd some 
support for the claim. Further analysis shows that both the country groups have an 
equal share of subsidiaries as per industry sectors (manufacturing versus services), 
have almost similar distributions of subsidiaries as per management structures, 
subsidiary age and subsidiary size — this shows that there may be some (external) 
country level characteristics that are inﬂuencing the international role, however 
such claims in this study are difﬁcult to make. The two country groups slightly 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
differ in motives. Both the number of subsidiaries and their mean scores (among 
UK based subsidiaries) are larger on seeking motives (resources, R&D, technol- 
ogy) than Australian based subsidiaries which primarily have exploiting  motives 
e.g. selling products — no signiﬁcant differences among motives however are 
found. This may partly explain that a slight variation in motives may reﬂect the 
signiﬁcant differences in international roles among the two country groups. 
Results using the same test show no signiﬁcant differences in international 
roles  among  subsidiaries  based  upon  their   investment  origins      (Greenﬁeld 
(N ¼ 174; µ ¼ 2:34); Acquisitions (N ¼ 202; µ ¼ 2:2)). The ﬁndings goes in- 
consistent with the existing claim that suggests that acquired subsidiaries are more 
likely to export than others (see Estrin et al.,  2008). 
 
 
Subsidiary autonomy and global initiative by industry 
and management structures 
Subsidiary level of autonomy and global initiatives are analysed as per industry 
and management structures. In order to check for statistically signiﬁcant differ- 
ences among groups, Kruskal–Wallis analysis of variance test is employed. As for 
subsidiary global initiative, some statistically signiﬁcant differences among in- 
dustry groups (Primary Industries (µ ¼ 2:4); Manufacturing (µ ¼ 2:01); Services 
(µ ¼ 1:73)) are found. Subsidiaries belonging to manufacturing industry    sector 
(H ¼ 6:066; df ¼ 1; p ¼ 0:014) show a higher incidence of global market initia- 
tive than subsidiaries belonging to service industry sector. 
As per industry sectors, analysis of strategic autonomy (Primary Industries    
(µ ¼ 3:2); Manufacturing (µ ¼ 3:51); Services (µ ¼ 3:44)) and operational  au- 
tonomy  (Primary  Industries  (µ ¼ 3:4);  Manufacturing  (µ ¼ 3:83);    Services 
(µ ¼ 3:69)) shows no signiﬁcant differences, indicating that subsidiaries (as per 
industry) do not differ in terms of autonomy.. 
As  per  management  structures  (parent  control  (µ ¼ 1:57);  RHQ/ofﬁces  
(µ ¼ 1:72); mandated ofﬁces (µ ¼ 1:72); network/DHQ control (µ ¼ 2:2); inde- 
pendent control (µ ¼ 2:18)), results show some signiﬁcant differences. 
Subsidiaries managed by network/DHQs show a higher (H ¼ 5:934; df ¼ 1; p ¼ 
0:015) incidence of global market initiative than subsidiaries managed by  parent 
headquarters,  and  subsidiaries managed by RHQs/ofﬁces (H ¼ 4:723; df ¼ 1;  
p ¼ 0:03). Subsidiaries managed independently show a higher incidence of global 
market initiatives than subsidiaries managed directly by parent companies (H ¼ 10: 
750; df ¼ 1;   p ¼ 0:0010),   and   subsidiaries    managed    by    RHQs/ofﬁces 
(H ¼ 16:123; df ¼ 1; p ¼ 0:000). 
Analysis  (as  per  management  structures)  of  subsidiary  strategic autonomy 
(parent control (µ ¼ 3:3); RHQ/ofﬁces (µ ¼ 3:31); mandated ofﬁces (µ ¼ 2:94); 
1450032-17 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
network/DHQ control (µ ¼ 3:27); independent management (µ ¼ 3:9)), and 
subsidiary  operational  autonomy  (parent   control   (µ ¼ 3:5);   RHQ/ofﬁces  
(µ ¼ 3:6); mandated ofﬁces (µ ¼ 3:17); network/DHQ control (µ ¼ 3:67); inde- 
pendent (µ ¼ 4:19)) is made. Results show that subsidiaries managed indepen- 
dently have higher strategic autonomy (H ¼ 15:673; df ¼ 1; p ¼ 0:000) and 
higher operational autonomy (H ¼ 22:071; df ¼ 1; p ¼ 0:000) than subsidiaries 
managed  by  parent  headquarters;  higher  strategic  autonomy  (H ¼ 42:861;  
df ¼ 1; p ¼ 0:000)  and   higher   operational   autonomy (H ¼ 38:461; df ¼ 1; 
p ¼ 0:000) than subsidiaries managed by RHQs/ofﬁces; higher strategic autonomy 
(H ¼ 14:643; df ¼ 1; p ¼ 0:000)     and     higher     operational      autonomy  
(H ¼ 18:198; df ¼ 1; p ¼ 0:000) than mandated ofﬁces; and higher strategic au- 
tonomy  (H ¼ 9:066; df ¼ 1; p ¼ 0:003)  and  higher   operational   autonomy 
(H ¼ 6:264; df ¼ 1; p ¼ 0:012) than subsidiaries managed by a network/DHQs. 
 
Subsidiary groups 
The section reports a Two-step cluster analysis to examine whether subsidiaries 
can be classiﬁed according to their international roles (Table 5). Two groups of 
subsidiaries emerge with one having signiﬁcantly higher scores than the other for 
all the variables studied including exports, strategic and operational autonomy, 
global initiative, global initiative resource support received and perceptions to use 
New Zealand as an export base. The results show that cluster 2 (36.8% of 
subsidiaries) have higher mean scores than cluster 1. An analysis of variance is 
conducted (using Kruskal–Wallis test) to check for the signiﬁcant differences 
among the mean scores of groups to show how cluster membership are driven — 
both the clusters are signiﬁcantly different with subsidiaries in cluster 2 more 
active in exports and global initiatives, more autonomous, and receive more parent 
resource support than the subsidiaries in cluster 1. The classiﬁcation show that 
there are two types of subsidiaries in New Zealand with one having more 
opportunities to develop international role than the other. The two subsidiary 
groups can be classiﬁed as Constrained Subsidiaries (cluster 1), and Uncon- 
strained Subsidiaries (cluster 2). 
Subsidiary groups are further analysed by industry, country of origin, entry 
mode and reporting channels (see Appendix C). It is found that the majority (76%) 
of the Constrained subsidiaries are managed by parent headquarters, regional 
headquarters/ofﬁces and mandated ofﬁces. This shows that majority of subsidiaries 
that are managed by parent headquarters, regional headquarters and branches have 
a lower export role, are less autonomous, and less entrepreneurial in global mar- 
kets compared to other subsidiaries. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.  Subsidiary groups. 
 
 Constrained 
subsidiaries - 
Cluster 1 (63.2%) 
Unconstrained 
subsidiaries - 
Cluster 2 (36.8%) 
 
Variables µ µ p-value 
Serve markets outside New 1.79 3.13 0.000 
Zealand    
Strategic autonomy 3.2 3.92 0.000 
Operational autonomy 3.48 4.21 0.000 
Global initiative 1.28 2.85 0.000 
Global initiative – resource 0.02 1.23 0.000 
support received    
New Zealand as an export 2.39 2.99 0.002 
base    
Total 271 158 
 
Further analysis on Constrained subsidiaries show that majority (parent control: 
72%; RHQ control: 99%; mandated ofﬁce control: 93%) of these subsidiaries are 
headquartered in the Asia Paciﬁc region with majority (67%) based in Australia. 
This shows that subsidiaries that have controlling ofﬁces in the region have rel- 
atively lesser propensity to take on international roles than others. It can be argued 
that controlling ofﬁces in the region either take, or allocate international roles to 
other locations of strategic importance while maintaining close control over sub- 
sidiary activity. It may also be argued that the existence of an ofﬁce in the region 
with controlling mandates is associated with having multiple subsidiaries in the 
region and organisations have no need for intra-regional trade as they have 
operations in other locations or they select other places as their export base or both. 
Overall the study results show that New Zealand subsidiaries are slightly dif- 
ferent from subsidiaries of other developed countries in terms of knowledge 
seeking and dominant export oriented strategy of Greek subsidiaries (Manolo- 
poulos, 2010) from Scotland and Ireland that mainly have specialised 
manufacturing roles (Delany, 1998; Tavares, 2002; Young et al., 2003), and from 
subsidiaries in overall United Kingdom that due to their global entrepreneurial 
orientation are being known as entrepreneurial subsidiaries (Boojihawon et al., 
2007; Dutton et al., 1999). Subsidiaries in general are understood as having the 
tendency to evolve from as low as branch plants (Firn, 1975), to developmental 
subsidiaries (Young et al., 1994), and to the entrepreneurial subsidiaries (Dimi- 
tratos et al., 2009a,b). While New Zealand is a remote country and unlike other 
small developed countries does not enjoy proximity to other developed markets 
(including Europe and North America); it does however have proximity to   other 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
markets in the Asia Paciﬁc region where subsidiaries can actively pursue en- 
trepreneurial opportunities. 
 
 
Conclusions 
This exploratory study has ﬁve main conclusions. First, two types of subsidiaries 
are identiﬁed in New Zealand based upon their international engagement: Con- 
strained and Unconstrained subsidiaries. These categories are unique to this study 
but contain aspects of subsidiary behaviour observed in other studies. For ex- 
ample, the Unconstrained subsidiary ﬁts with the observation that subsidiaries with 
high levels of strategic autonomy are more likely to a have a global mandate than 
those with little autonomy. (Birkinshaw and Morrison, 1995), and a higher inci- 
dence of initiative taking along with higher levels of parent MNE resource 
support than the other subsidiaries. (Birkinshaw, 1999). Results have shown that 
subsidiaries managed by ofﬁces in the region in which subsidiaries operate have 
less potential and participation in international roles than subsidiaries managed 
independently, and managed by network/Divisional headquarters. 
Second, a partial support to (one of the two contrasting claims) that whether the 
trade propensity of subsidiaries is related to the investor country of origin or not is 
found (see Fontagne and Pajot, 1997; Lipsey, 1991; O’Sullivan, 1993; Yamawaki, 
2007). Findings (e.g. UK versus Australian subsidiaries in the study) suggest a 
relation exists — this is seen mainly as a reﬂection of different motives of 
investments that may be common among MNEs within in a particular country and/ 
or different among a number of countries. It is asserted that MNEs of different 
countries of origin tend to see beneﬁts in the host country that may be unique to 
their country e.g. New Zealand beneﬁts may be unique to UK, but not to Australia 
(due to the geographical location that the two countries i.e. Australia and New 
Zealand, share). No differences among subsidiaries based upon their investment 
origins/entry mode however found. It is therefore concluded that international 
activities including serving international markets, exports, etc. are not related to 
subsidiary investments origins. 
Third, subsidiaries afﬁliated to the primary sector are more likely to develop 
international roles than are subsidiaries afﬁliated to other sectors. New Zealand is a 
predominantly land-based economy with a high dependence on agriculture, ﬁshing 
and forestry as sources of overseas income with many of the country's largest 
enterprises linked to these parts of the economy. Previous studies have established 
that subsidiaries operating in a dynamic environment are more likely to develop 
broad roles than are those in stable activities (Verbeke et al., 2007). On the basis 
that  the  primary  sector  is  the most  dynamic component  of the  New  Zealand 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
economy, the study's ﬁnding is consistent with this broader argument. 
Manufacturing industry subsidiaries are more likely to export, serve international 
markets, and be globally entrepreneurial than subsidiaries that belong to the ser- 
vices industry. This ﬁnding has implications for manufacturing subsidiaries in 
New Zealand — subsidiaries that take on internal market initiatives seek (from 
parent MNE) for development (e.g. R&D, manufacturing) facilities to be moved to 
their operations. Such facilities provide opportunities for subsidiaries to increase 
their value-added contributory role, develop and form centers of excellence 
(Birkinshaw, 1996; Birkinshaw et al., 1998). 
Fourth, the management structure under which the subsidiary operates is an 
indicator of the roles performed by a subsidiary. This study found that subsidiaries 
that are managed independently tend to be more likely to export and undertake 
initiatives with global application than are subsidiaries managed by the parent 
headquarters or by a regional headquarters. Similarly, subsidiaries managed in- 
dependently tend to have higher strategic and operational autonomy than 
subsidiaries under any of the other forms of management structure identiﬁed in the 
study. Participation in initiatives with global application is found to increase where 
the subsidiary is managed by a network of relationships or by a divisional head- 
quarters than where the subsidiary is managed by the parent headquarters or by a 
regional headquarters. These ﬁndings indicate the importance of giving greater 
attention to the management structure through which a subsidiary is controlled 
than has tended to be given  previously. 
Fifth, ﬁndings indicate that the overall roles of a subsidiary are a complex 
phenomenon and may not be accurately determined with the assumption that 
subsidiaries play only one role at a time — this conclusion supports the theoretical 
claim that existing subsidiary role typologies are overly simplistic and generic in 
their assumptions (Enright and Subramanian, 2007). More than three quarters of 
subsidiaries in New Zealand take on a number of different roles (at varying 
extents) at one time, and while serving the local market is dominated as the 
primary role, this may not reﬂect a number of other roles (as so the overall role) 
that subsidiaries take or may take in  future. 
Finally, the overall importance of this exploratory study is the discovery that a 
wide variety of foreign-owned subsidiaries in New Zealand take on some form of 
international role. This contrasts with a tendency to assume that because 
subsidiaries in New Zealand are established principally to serve the local market 
this precludes them taking on broader responsibilities for the parent organisation. 
This happens because subsidiaries even when serving the local market have a 
tendency to acquire specialised resources and distinctive capabilities that help 
them further the role of their subsidiary. To be clear the international role that is 
developed may still account for a small share of the subsidiary's total activity but it 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
does mean an additional growth path is opened up for the subsidiary. Awareness 
of this potential has signiﬁcant implications for New Zealand policy makers 
concerned with the control or promotion of inward foreign direct investment. It 
suggests that the beneﬁts of foreign investment may be underestimated by the lack 
of recognition of the way that a local market focus does not preclude subsidiaries 
developing international roles. This has potential to considerably increase the case 
for encouraging foreign investment. A ﬁrst step toward achieving this is to gather 
further insight into the developing international roles of foreign-owned companies 
and to provide information on exemplar internalised subsidiaries as a way of 
demonstrating the feasibility of allocating international roles to subsidiaries in 
New Zealand. 
 
 
Appendices 
Appendix A. Autonomy (strategic and operational) 
 
 
 
Subsidiary autonomy 
 
Factor loadings 
Reliability 
analysis 
Strategic autonomy 
Hiring senior personnel 
 
0.713 
0.832 
Outsourcing production/services 0.762  
New market development 0.637  
New product development 0.641  
Annual budget setting 0.704  
Changes in the organization of activity 
in New Zealand 
Financing (debt/equity) 
0.678 
 
0.660 
 
Choice of technology 0.669  
Operational autonomy 
Changes in standard operating 
 
0.865 
0.680 
procedures 
Changes in product/service design 0.776 
Day to day management 0.721 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B. Activities supporting innovation 
 
 
Percentage of subsidiaries 
 
 
Activity 
2005 
% 
2007 
% 
2009 
% 
2011 
% 
Average 
% 
Acquired machinery and equipment 28 15 21 13 19 
Acquired computer hardware and software 52 24 21 19 29 
Acquired other knowledge 18 11 12 9 13 
Implemented new business strategies or management 41 21 20 15 24 
techniques      
Organisational restructure 39 13 12 10 19 
Design (e.g. industrial, graphic or fashion design) 18 11 12 12 13 
Marketed the introduction of new goods or  services 37 29 21 23 28 
Market research 33 18 15 14 20 
Signiﬁcant changes to marketing strategies 24 12 12 7 14 
Employee training 57 33 26 23 35 
 
Appendix C. Characteristics of subsidiary groups 
 
 
Subsidiary 
clusters Industry Entry mode Country of origin 
Management 
structures 
Constrained 
subsidiaries 
Primary Industry: 2  Greenﬁeld: 115 USA: 77 Parent: 32 (73%) 
 
Manufacturing: 108  Acquisition: 125   Australia: 76 RHQ: 159 (70%) 
Services: 161 Merger: 10 UK: 14 Mandated Ofﬁce: 
15 (83%) 
Franchise: 3 Germany: 22 Network: 7 (47%) 
Joint Venture: 12  Japan: 23 Independent: 58 
(46%) 
 
 
 
Unconstrained 
subsidiaries 
Other: 6 Switzerland 13 
Other: 46 
Primary Industry: 3  Greenﬁeld: 62 USA: 34 Parent: 12 (27%) 
 
Manufacturing: 82    Acquisition: 79 Australia: 36 RHQ: 67 (30%) 
Services: 72 Merger: 5 UK: 23 Mandated Ofﬁce: 
03 (17%) 
Franchise: 1 Japan:15 Network: 08 (53%) 
Joint Venture: 8 Other: 50 Independent: 68 (54%) 
Other: 3 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix D. Research questions and measurement 
 
 
Research question Measurement Source/Inﬂuence 
1 Subsidiary potential to 
take on international 
roles 
● Autonomy (strategic and 
operational autonomy in 
Appendix A): On a scale of 
1–5, what level of decision 
making authority do New 
Zealand subsidiaries have? 
● Export Base: On a scale of 
1–4, to what extent opportu- 
nities to use New Zealand as 
an export base are recognised 
by the parent MNEs? 
● Resource Support Recieved 
(for): Developing new pro- 
ducts/services in New Zealand 
to be sold internationally  
(N/A (0), None (1), Partial (2), 
Full (3)) 
(Ambos et al., 2010; Ambos and 
Birkinshaw, 2010; 
Birkinshaw et al., 1998; 
Borini et al., 2009; 
Enderwick, 1995; 
Gammelgaard et al., 2012; 
Raziq et al., 2012; Raziq and 
Perry, 2012b) 
2 How are the current 
motives of foreign 
multinationals to 
operate in New 
Zealand explained? 
3 To what extent is the 
international role 
related to subsidiary 
country of origin, type 
of investment, 
industry, and 
management 
structures? 
4 What is the extent of 
See Table 2 (KPMG, 1995; Scott-Kennel, 
2001) 
 
 
 
— (Estrin et al., 2008; Fontagne and 
Pajot, 1997; Lipsey, 1991; 
O’Sullivan, 1993; Raziq and 
Perry, 2013; Yamawaki, 
2007) 
 
 
 
● Local Market: On a scale of 1–  (Birkinshaw et al., 1998; Borini 
international role taken 
by subsidiaries? 
5, to what extent New Zealand 
subsidiaries serve New Zeal- 
and market. 
● International Market: On a 
scale of 1–5, to what extent 
New Zealand subsidiaries 
serve markets outside of New 
Zealand. 
● Global Initiative: On a scale of 
1–4, in the past 5 years,  to 
et al., 2009; Raziq et al., 
2012, 2013; Raziq and Perry, 
2012b) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix D  (Continued ) 
Research question  Measurement  
Source/Inﬂuence what extent New Zealand 
subsidiaries developed new 
products/services in New 
Zealand to be sold interna- 
tionally? 
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